Federalist 68
Alexander Hamilton
The Mode of Electing the President
From the New York Packet.
Friday, March 14, 1788.
To the People of the State of New York:
THE mode of appointment of the Chief Magistrate of
the United States is almost the only part of the system, of any
consequence, which has escaped without severe censure, or which has
received the slightest mark of approbation from its opponents. The most
plausible of these, who has appeared in print, has even deigned to admit
that the election of the President is pretty well guarded. I venture
somewhat further, and hesitate not to affirm, that if the manner of it
be not perfect, it is at least excellent. It unites in an eminent degree
all the advantages, the union of which was to be wished for.
It was desirable that the sense of the people
should operate in the choice of the person to whom so important a trust
was to be confided. This end will be answered by committing the right of
making it, not to any preestablished body, but to men chosen by the
people for the special purpose, and at the particular conjuncture
Another and no less important desideratum was,
that the Executive should be independent for his continuance in office
on all but the people themselves. He might otherwise be tempted to
sacrifice his duty to his complaisance for those whose favor was
necessary to the duration of his official consequence. This advantage
will also be secured, by making his re-election to depend on a special
body of representatives, deputed by the society for the single purpose
of making the important choice.
All these advantages will happily combine in the
plan devised by the convention; which is, that the people of each State
shall choose a number of persons as electors, equal to the number of
senators and representatives of such State in the national government,
who shall assemble within the State, and vote for some fit person as
President. Their votes, thus given, are to be transmitted to the seat of
the national government, and the person who may happen to have a
majority of the whole number of votes will be the President. But as a
majority of the votes might not always happen to centre in one man, and
as it might be unsafe to permit less than a majority to be conclusive,
it is provided that, in such a contingency, the House of Representatives
shall select out of the candidates who shall have the five highest
number of votes, the man who in their opinion may be best qualified for
the office.
The process of election affords a moral certainty,
that the office of President will never fall to the lot of any man who
is not in an eminent degree endowed with the requisite qualifications.
Talents for low intrigue, and the little arts of popularity, may alone
suffice to elevate a man to the first honors in a single State; but it
will require other talents, and a different kind of merit, to establish
him in the esteem and confidence of the whole Union, or of so
considerable a portion of it as would be necessary to make him a
successful candidate for the distinguished office of President of the
United States. It will not be too strong to say, that there will be a
constant probability of seeing the station filled by characters
pre-eminent for ability and virtue. And this will be thought no
inconsiderable recommendation of the Constitution, by those who are able
to estimate the share which the executive in every government must
necessarily have in its good or ill administration. Though we cannot
acquiesce in the political heresy of the poet who says: “For forms of
government let fools contest That which is best administered is best,”
yet we may safely pronounce, that the true test of a good government is
its aptitude and tendency to produce a good administration.
Another and no less important desideratum was,
that the Executive should be independent for his continuance in office
on all but the people themselves. He might otherwise be tempted to
sacrifice his duty to his complaisance for those whose favor was
necessary to the duration of his official consequence. This advantage
will also be secured, by making his re-election to depend on a special
body of representatives, deputed by the society for the single purpose
of making the important choice.
All these advantages will happily combine in the
plan devised by the convention; which is, that the people of each State
shall choose a number of persons as electors, equal to the number of
senators and representatives of such State in the national government,
who shall assemble within the State, and vote for some fit person as
President. Their votes, thus given, are to be transmitted to the seat of
the national government, and the person who may happen to have a
majority of the whole number of votes will be the President. But as a
majority of the votes might not always happen to centre in one man, and
as it might be unsafe to permit less than a majority to be conclusive,
it is provided that, in such a contingency, the House of Representatives
shall select out of the candidates who shall have the five highest
number of votes, the man who in their opinion may be best qualified for
the office.
The process of election affords a moral certainty,
that the office of President will never fall to the lot of any man who
is not in an eminent degree endowed with the requisite qualifications.
Talents for low intrigue, and the little arts of popularity, may alone
suffice to elevate a man to the first honors in a single State; but it
will require other talents, and a different kind of merit, to establish
him in the esteem and confidence of the whole Union, or of so
considerable a portion of it as would be necessary to make him a
successful candidate for the distinguished office of President of the
United States. It will not be too strong to say, that there will be a
constant probability of seeing the station filled by characters
pre-eminent for ability and virtue. And this will be thought no
inconsiderable recommendation of the Constitution, by those who are able
to estimate the share which the executive in every government must
necessarily have in its good or ill administration. Though we cannot
acquiesce in the political heresy of the poet who says: “For forms of
government let fools contest That which is best administered is best,”
yet we may safely pronounce, that the true test of a good government is
its aptitude and tendency to produce a good administration.
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